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Abstract: In this paper we analyze why Naxalism (an ultra-left movement) still 
persists in pockets of India. One popular perception about the existence of Naxalism 
is deprivation. We examine deprivation in terms of seven development indicators, 
namely, access to health and health outcomes; access to education and educational 
outcomes; access to finance; access to communication and other basic amenities; 
nature of work participation; living standard; and poverty. We examine the hypothesis 
whether people living from rest of India has a better living standard in comparison to 
people living in the Red Corridor region (areas affected by Naxalism). We find 
evidence that Red Corridor region is deprived in comparison to rest of India. 
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Introduction 
 
Of late, India has experienced an upsurge in Maoist activity and related insurgency in the 
Red Corridor region4 of India. Maoists have consolidated their strength in different 
districts of the states through guerrilla warfare against the security forces. Landmine 
blasts and ambush killings of central and para-military personnel have become frequent 
news headlines in national dailies. In retaliation, the states have also launched “Operation 
Green Hunt”, a “security centric” programme, to curb Maoistattacks either by killing or 
by arresting Maoist leaders and their comrades. Many innocent lives have been lost in 
this bloody battle between the states and the Maoists. Social researchers view this rise of 
Maoism in India as an outcome of development policy failures.   
 
In fact, in recent times, much of the development policy debates in India are centred on 
issues relating to unequal income distribution (D. S. Tendulkar 2010; Nilanjan Banik 
2009), socio-demographic disparity (J.N. Kurian 2000), poverty (C.Purfield 2006), 
institutions (K. Kochar et al. 2006), and deprivation (B.Debroy and L. Bhandari 2003). 
Each of these issues has received considerable media (both print and electronic) attention 
under the garb of Naxalism5, inclusive growth, and corruption. Tendulkar (D. S. 
Tendulkar 2010) admits that during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) there has been 
a rise in summary measures of relative inequality (Gini-coefficients), especially in the 
urban areas. Nilanjan Banik while identifying types of inequalities, and reasons for their 
existence, also draws a distinction between equity and equality6 (Nilanjan Banik 2009). 
Measuring disparities in terms of sex ratio (females per 1000 males), female literacy, 
infant mortality and the level of infrastructure development, J.N. Kurian finds evidence 
of widening regional disparities in India (J. N. Kurian 2000). In a similar vein, C. Purfield 
conducts a state level analysis and finds that the richer states have been more successful 
                                                 
4
 The Red Corridor is a region comprising parts of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal with considerable Naxalite activities. 
5
 Naxalism is a social movement which mobilizes landless labourers and displaced tribals into cadres with 
the aim of overthrowing the Indian State, and supplanting it with a stateless and classless society through 
armed revolution. We consider the two terms “Naxalism” and “Maoism” as synonymous, and hence use 
them interchangeably in thischapter. 
6
 Equality is aligned with positive economics, providing evidence about income distribution (through Gini 
coefficient) without commenting about what should have been an ideal income distribution. Equity, on the 
other hand, is based on value judgment and argues what should have been an ideal income distribution. 
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in terms of reducing poverty, and capital flow (alongside with job creation), in 
comparison to the poorer states (Purfield 2006). Kochar et al. find that states with weaker 
institutions and poorer infrastructure experienced lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
and lower industrial growth (Kochar et al. 2006). At a sub-regional (district) level, B. 
Debroy and Bhandari identify the most backward districts benchmarking them on the 
attainment of Millennium Development Goals (set by UNDP) across six measures of 
socio-economic progress: poverty, hunger, literacy, immunization, infant mortality and 
elementary enrolment. They find India’s worst districts are located in Bihar, UP, 
Jharkhand, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Maharashtra, West Bengal and 
Chhattisgarh, with a few districts from Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu 
thrown in (B. Debroy and L. Bhandari 2003).    
 
The upshot of this brief literature review is that pockets of deprivation exist. The market 
is still not perfect,7 and there are ways to increase overall productivity through making 
the market work for the poor and deprived. Imperfection in labour8 and capital market 
affects9 distribution of income. Imperfection in the goods market thwarts opportunity to 
earn income. Imperfection in the judicial system means that the deprived do not enjoy 
any legal right(s), leading to exploitation and discrimination. Although, economists and 
policymakers, in general, are worried about individual well-being, and the factors 
affecting this well-being, they somehow seem to assume the market is perfect (better 
known as Classical Assumption). All the growth models, namely, the Solow growth 
model, endogenous growth models, (P. Romer 1990; N. G. Mankiw et al., 1992) etc., 
have tried to explain higher standard of living (read, per-capita income) without explicitly 
accounting for market imperfection. In fact, the fundamental assumption for these growth 
models to work is to assume that the capital market is perfect – so that whatever is saved 
can be invested for productive purposes. Development economists have looked at other 
factors, such as better access to health and education – not otherwise considered in the 
                                                 
7
 The market is perfect when providers of goods and services are able to participate, and get returns 
according to the value of marginal product. There are no entry barriers, and factors of production operate 
under perfectly competitive setting.   
8
 The labour market is not perfect because of discrimination and reservation on the basis of caste, religion, 
and gender.  
9
 Under perfect capital market conditions anyone with profitable investment opportunity will be able to 
either borrow money to finance it, or to sell equity in a firm set up to undertake it.  
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growth models – as indicators of well-being. They also do not explicitly focus on market 
imperfection.  
 
Keeping in mind these theoretical limitations, we provide evidence that the poor suffer 
from market imperfection. Often markets do not exist, and it is the responsibility of the 
government (both at the Centre and in the states) to provide public goods to help the poor 
participate in the market. However, since there is no user charge for using public goods, it 
is the quality and the delivery mechanism of these public goods which makes the 
difference. Poor quality (of roads, electricity supply, etc.), and an inefficient delivery 
system of services such as education and healthcare, make it costlier for the poor to 
participate in the market. In addition, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies raise 
transaction costs in the asset market (such as land), important for the poor.  
 
Thus, it is the socially and economically deprived group of people who takes up arms 
against the State in the name of Naxalism. The Expert Group appointed by the Planning 
Commission in its report (2008) described Naxalism “as a political movement with a 
strong base among the landless and poor peasantry and adivasis. Its emergence and 
growth need sto be contextualised in the social conditions and experience of people who 
form a part of it. The huge gap between state policy and performance is a feature of these 
conditions. Though its professed long-term ideology is capturing State power by force, in 
its day-to-day manifestation it is to be looked upon as basically a fight for social justice, 
equality, protection and local development.”10  
 
In this chapter we will focus on Naxalism, and the reasons for its persistence and spread. 
One popular notion in India is that the Red Corridor region of India is one of the most 
backward. Socio-economic development of the region has been abysmal since 
independence. As a result, the Maoists have been able to win the confidence of the 
                                                 
10
 “Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas- Report of an Expert Group”, 2008. Expert Group 
was constituted by Planning Commission, GOI,  pp. 59-60, at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 
accessed on Jan 30, 2012. 
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deprived sections of the population living here, and have organised them to revolt against 
the government. A careful review of the existing body of literature reveals that the 
popular notion of underdevelopment mentioned previously is based mostly on anecdotal 
evidence. To the best of our knowledge, no rigorous study has been done to explore 
underdevelopment of the Red Corridor region vis-à-vis the rest of India where Maoism 
has not proliferated. The objective of this study is to fill this gap in the literature. This 
study is completely based on secondary data, and hence other reasons often cited by 
social researchers such as oppression of various marginalized groups like the tribals and 
dalits by the State, human rights violations, political marginalization etc., are clearly 
outside the purview of our study.  
 
We examine deprivation in terms of seven development indicators, namely, access to 
health and health outcomes; access to education and educational outcomes; access to 
finance; access to communication and other basic amenities; nature of work participation; 
the living standard; and poverty. Our results show that the Red Corridor region is indeed 
impoverished in comparison to the rest of India (henceforth, ROI) in terms of most of the 
indicators of well-being considered in this chapter. The rest of the chapter is organised as 
follows. In section 2 we focus on macro-level factors (such as income inequality) which 
might have been responsible for the genesis of Naxalism in the Red Corridor region. In 
section 3 we focus on some micro-level factors such as deprivation in terms of standard 
development indicators. Section 4 presents the methodology and results. In section 5 we 
discuss government interventions to combat Naxalism. Section 6 concludes our study. 
 
Unequal Income Distribution  
According to K. S. Subramanian (2005), “[N]axalism is essentially an expression of the 
people’s aspiration to a life of dignity and self-respect.” Much of the self-respect and 
dignity is lost due to limited opportunity to earn income. A popular perception is that the 
root cause for the rise of Naxalism in India is unequal income distribution. If we consider 
the period before and after reforms, a pertinent question is whether the people are more 
deprived now than they were before. This  question arises because of recent spurt in 
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Naxalite activities for the period after reforms.11 Although there were a few reforms 
initiated during the early eighties, the all-encompassing process of reforms started in 
1991.12 
 
It is to be noted that during the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-1989), India’s annual 
growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) was around 5.5 per cent. During the Eighth 
Five Year Plan (1992-1996) the GDP growth rate has increased to 6.5 per cent, and 
during the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2006) the GDP growth rate has further increased 
to 7.7 per cent (Central Statistical Organization, Government of India). This higher 
growth rate resulted in higher per-capita income and lower poverty numbers. India’s per-
capita GDP, measured in terms of constant US  dollar rates of 2005, increased from $ 215 
during 1975 to $ 293 during 1988, and further to $ 1140 during 2009 (World 
Development Indicators, 2012). Likewise, the poverty number (measured in terms of 
headcount ratio)13 declined from 36 per cent in 1993-94 to 27.5 per cent in 2004-05.14 
Measured by these numbers, broad- based economic reforms have increased overall 
economic well-being. How then can we explain social unrest at a time of high income 
growth? Or, more specifically, why is there a spurt in Maoist activities in spite of India 
witnessing a higher growth? 
 
The answer to this apparent puzzle lies in examining the impact of reforms on income 
distribution. Reforms entail unequal payoffs to economic agents. People with higher 
skills stand to gain more compared to those with lower skill sets (read, less productive 
people). This has resulted in more skewed income distribution leading to social unrest. 
Box 1 briefly discusses the genesis and evolution of the Maoist movement in India. 
 
                                                 
11
 In March 2012, Maoists abducted two foreign nationals in Odisha. In the very next month, in 
Chattisgarh, they abducted a District-Collector. In both the cases, the abducted victims were later released 
unhurt after some of the demands made by the Maoists were met. 
12
 Reforms mean policies adopted by the Central Government to promote globalization and liberalization. 
13
 HCR is measured as proportion of the population living below the poverty line. India’s official poverty 
lines in 1993-94 were Rs 205.84 and Rs 281.33 for rural and urban India, respectively.  In 2004-05, poverty 
lines were Rs 356.30 and Rs 538.60 for rural and urban India, respectively.  
14
 Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.  
 7
Looking at the share of sectoral GDP, we find that the share of agriculture in national 
income has fallen from 56.90 per cent during 1950-51 to 14.6 per cent during 2009-10. 
On the other hand, share of the services sector in national income has increased from 
29.80 per cent during 1950-51 to 57.2 per cent during 2009-10. The share of the 
manufacturing sector has remained more or less constant at around 27 per cent after 
1992. While looking at the number of people who are earning their livelihood from these 
three sectors, it can be seen that  around 57 per cent of the Indian population earns their 
livelihood from agricultural, and agriculture-related allied activities, compared to less 
than 10 per cent of the population earning their livelihood from the organized services 
sector. The rest of the people are working in the manufacturing sector. What does it 
mean? In simple words, if the national income (GDP) is Rs 100 then agricultural and 
allied activities are contributing 14.6 per cent of the national income, that is, Rs 14.6, in 
comparison to Rs 57.2 generated by the services sector. Income inequality becomes 
evident as it is like distributing Rs 14.6 to around 57 people, as compared to distributing 
Rs 57.2 to less than 10 people. What is more worrying is that this inequality is going to 
rise rapidly. Going by 2009-10 data agricultural sector is growing at an annual rate of 1.7 
per cent in comparison to services growing at a rate of 8.7 per cent. If this trend 
continues, then the share of agriculture in national income is going to become a single 
digit number within the next 15 years – contributing more to inequality in income 
distribution.     
 
Also, the share of income generated by the agricultural sector is more volatile (measured 
by the variance of the growth rates) in comparison to manufacturing, services, and overall 
GDP. Looking at the coefficient of variation15 (CV) we find that it is the highest for the 
agricultural sector in comparison to industry and services (see Table 1). Moreover, 
uncertainty of agricultural income makes things even worse. Uncertainties associated 
with income have two specific outcomes: postponement of investment decisions and 
migration. Postponement of investment decisions has a bearing on future income, and 
reduces future expected earning. Besides, uncertainty associated with volatile income 
causes migration. As ‘expected’ return in the urban sector (dominated by the services 
                                                 
15
 CV = (standard deviation /mean) × 100 
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sector) is higher than ‘actual’ return in the agricultural sector, poor landless agricultural 
workers often resort to migration for finding employment and livelihood opportunities. 
However, a majority of the migrant labourers lack adequate skills to get meaningful 
employment in the organized service sector. Consequently, these unemployed people 
contribute to skewed income distribution. As bulk of the tribals and adivasis are primarily 
dependent on agriculture and allied activities, and for those who have migrated to urban 
areas are less-skilled and typically get absorbed in the urban unorganized sector, it is no 
wonder why they are the ones who are left at the bottom of income distribution.  
 
Box 1: A Brief History and Recent Account of Maoist Movement in India 
The Naxalite movement takes its name from a peasant uprising which took place in May 
1967 at Naxalbari, a village on the north-eastern tip of India, situated near the town of 
Siliguri in the state of West Bengal. The genesis of Naxalism in India can be traced back 
to the formation of the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) in 1969. 
After the death of Charu Mazumdar in 1972, the party got divided and hence the 
movement also became fragmented. Subsequently, the formation of the People’s War 
Group (PWG) in 1980 under the leadership of Maoist leader Kondapalli Seetharamaiah 
provided freshlife to the dying movement. In 2004, the movement got extra mileage 
when two different wings of the same movement: PWG and Maoist Communist Centre of 
India (MCCI) merged. The unified party was named as the Communist Party of India 
(Maoist).16 Due to the violent nature of the movement initiated by the party, it has been 
banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Despite being a banned 
party, “the cadre strength of the CPI (Maoist) climbed from 9,300 in 2004-05 to 10,500 in 
2005-06. Reports suggest they have a 25,000-member people’s militia and 50,000 
members in village-level units.”17  
According to the MHA, the left-wing extremism has spread its tentacles across several 
states in varying intensities. States which are severely affected by the movement are: 
Chhattishgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Bihar. Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and 
Maharashtra are partially affected by Naxalism. Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are 
                                                 
16
 For a detailed historic account of the Maoist movement in India see IDSA Occasional Paper No 20 by 
P.V. Ramana (2011), S. Banerjee (1980) and P. Singh (2006)  
17
 See G. Navlakha (2006, p. 2186) 
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the states marginally affected by Maoism (see Figure 1). R. K. Kujur (Kujur 2009) gives 
a brief account of Maoist violence in these states during 2008. Table 2 shows the extent 
of Naxalite violence in the Red Corridor region during 2007-2011. From Table 2 in the 
Appendix it is evident that Naxalite violence increased alarmingly in Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand and Odisha. The epicentre of this movement has been the Dandakaranya 
region which is largely covered by dense forest. 
 
 
Going Beyond Income: Some Stylized Facts 
India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has said that Maoism or Naxalism is the 
“the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”18 The Ministry 
of Home Affairs (MHA) describes Maoism as “a doctrine to capture State power through 
a combination of armed insurgency, mass mobilization and strategic alliances.”19 Is 
unequal income distribution the only plausible reason, or are there other factors that 
contribute to the emergence and persistence of Maoism?  
 
Income is one of the matrices for analyzing inequality. However, inequality also persists 
in terms of health, education, and other indicators of development (such as public 
services as indicated earlier). One popular notion is that the Red Corridor region is one of 
the most backward in India. Socio-economic development of the region has been very 
sluggish since independence. As a result the Maoists have been able to win the 
confidence of the deprived sections of the population living here and have organized 
them to revolt against the State. The present United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government has adopted a number of development programmes specifically targeted for 
the welfare of tribals but they remained impoverished and backward in terms of main 
development indicators: health, nutrition and education. “[T]he literacy rate of adivasis is 
at 23.8 per cent… [and as] many as 62.5 per cent of adivasi children who enter school 
dropout before they matriculate…. Among the tribals 28.9 per cent have no access 
                                                 
18
 “Ending the Red Corridor”, The Economist, February 25, 2010. 
19
 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-FAQ.pdf (Accessed on February 
23, 2012) 
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whatsoever to doctors and clinics.”20  The Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of 
Alienation of Tribal Land and Its Restoration (2004) also highlighted a similar state of 
deprivation, impoverishment of the poor tribals in India. The main supporters of the 
Maoist movement in India have been tribals, dalits and landless peasants. There are 
specific Articles21 in the Indian Constitution to safeguard interests of the tribals towards 
the bigger objective of achieving socio-economic equity. However, these Articles existed 
only on paper and the State failed to implement them in reality and adivasis’ needs and 
demands have not been adequately addressed by the State (R. K. Kumar 2009). “[T]hey 
have been unable to effectively articulate their grievances through the democratic and 
electoral process.”22 Lack of land reforms; displacement of tribals from their traditional 
lands due to industrial expansion; indiscriminate extraction of minerals results in 
environmental degradation and affects tribal life adversely; rapid disappearance of 
Common Property Resources (CPR) etc. are the key reasons for increasing resentment 
amongst the tribals. These poor tribals typically depend on forest resources for livelihood. 
For example, The Forest Conservation Act 1980 virtually evicted tribals from their 
forests which had been the sole source of their livelihood perennially. “The 
commercialisation and corporatisation of forest resources have reduced the access to 
them [tribals]. Alienation of tribal from land and control by richer non-tribal elements 
from outside are significant factors for tribal unrest. Displacement due to the construction 
of large dams and other industries has impoverished these communities and strengthened 
their demand for tribal self-governance.”23 Taking advantage of tribal resentment, 
Maoists stood beside them as sympathizers and organized them to revolt against 
oppression, neglect and for their rights. “[Maoists] have been telling the adivasis for 
years that the State is an oppressor....That is why they have taken up arms.”24   
 
The Maoist movement has also received tremendous support from dalit groups who are 
still deprived and have remained downtrodden in many states in India. According to S. 
Banerjee (S. Banerjee 2008:  p.11), “the dalits suffer from various types of disadvantages 
                                                 
20
 See R. Guha (2007, p 3306) 
21
 Articles 244, 244A, 275(1), 342 and 339 
22
 See R. Guha (2007, p 3305) 
23
 See K. S. Subramanian (2010, p 25) 
24
 See H. Kumar (2009, p 12) 
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like limited employment opportunities, political marginalisation, low education, social 
discrimination and human rights violation.” Studies have found that in some cases 
Maoists have been successful in protecting certain rights of tribals and dalits. In Bihar, 
Maoists helped the landless to acquire lands which had been taken over by the State from 
landlords under land reform programmes but were never redistributed amongst the 
landless (S. Banerjee 2008). In Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere in Dandakaranya region, 
Maoists have been successful in securing a higher minimum wage or better prices for the 
poor tribals who earn their livelihood by procuring tendu leaves (R. Guha 2007; N. 
Mukherji 2010; G. Navlakha 2010). 
 
From our discussion so far one might conclude that a high proportion of dalits and tribals 
in the population of a district is a sufficient condition for the rise of the Maoist 
movement. However, there is little evidence to support such a conjecture. “[T]here are 
many districts with high proportions of adivasis or dalits but little Naxalite activity, such 
as in Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.”25 So there is need for 
studying the development imbalance leading to a Maoist upsurge more rigorously 
without any bias. Existing studies lack empirical rigour as these are mostly anecdotal in 
nature and/or not based on a large sample to have a strongstatistical basis. Hence, in the 
next section we examine the development imbalance, if any, rigorously using standard 
statistical techniques. We use secondary data available from nationwide surveys and 
census carried out by independent organizations. This precludes a subjective bias in the 
selection of sample households for the surveys.   
 
The Red Corridor region vis-à-vis Rest of India 
We examine deprivation in terms of seven development indicators, namely, access to 
health and health outcomes; access to education and educational outcomes; access to 
finance; access to communication and other basic amenities; nature of work participation; 
living standard; and poverty. Our hypothesis is that the inability to provide quality life to 
the people living in the Red Corridor region is worse than that of rest of India (ROI). We 
examine this hypothesis by analyzing whether the average outcomes of the Red Corridor 
                                                 
25
 See Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas (2008), p 3. 
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region based on the seven development indicators are statistically significant or are worse 
than those of the regions with no history of Maoism, i.e. the ROI.  
 
Data 
The data on population, access to healthcare facilities and distance from health facilities, 
health outcome,access to education and distance from educational institutions, 
educational outcome, access to finance, access to communication and other basic 
amenities, and workforce participation, are taken from the Census 2001.26 We also use 
data on living standards, access to healthcare facilities and health awareness, housing 
condition, etc. available from the District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS-
3) conducted27 nationwide by the International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) 
Mumbai, in 2007-08. Data on per capita income (PCI) is taken from various reports 
published by the Planning Commission of India. Data on district-level poverty measured 
by the headcount ratio (HCR) is taken from Chaudhury and Gupta (S. Chaudhury and N. 
Gupta 2009)28. 
   
 
 
Methodology 
The study compares development indicators of the districts in the Red Corridor region 
with that of selected districts from the ROI. The districts of Red Corridor region studied 
here are given in the upper panel (panel A) of Table 3. These districts are selected from 
the list of districts identified for the implementation of the Integrated Action Plan (IAP).29 
The comparison districts30 from the ROI are selected from five31 states: Gujarat, 
                                                 
26
 We extensively used the Village Directory of the respective districts available from Census 2001. 
27
 The survey was funded by Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
28S.  Chaudhury and N. Gupta (2009) measure district level HCR based on 61st round of Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CES) conducted by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). 
29
 See http://pcserver.nic.in/iapmis/state_district_list.aspx 
 
30
 We consider a sample of districts because generating district level data from the raw census data is a 
painstaking process and it is also costly. Moreover, the number of districts falling in the Red Corridor 
region is relatively small compared to the number of districts in the rest of India. Hence sampling from the 
rest of India makes more sense. 
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Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. In these five states, the Maoist 
movement has not proliferated. The five ROI states are selected randomly in such a way 
that geographic heterogeneity is captured as well. Districts from each of these five states 
are selected on the basis of per capita income (PCI) in 1999.32 The districts of each of 
these five states are sorted in descending order in terms of PCI in 1999 and then top four, 
middle four33 and bottom34 four districts are selected from the sorted list. Thus, in the 
sample, a total of sixty and fifty-five districts are taken from both Red Corridor region 
and the ROI respectively.   
 
The following dimensions of development are considered in the analysis: 
i) Access to health, health outcome and awareness – availability of healthcare 
facilities; distance from such facility; infant mortality rate (IMR), life 
expectancy at birth (LEB); proportion of household using safe drinking water 
and proportion of household having a vaccination card. 
ii) Access to education and educational outcome – availability of educational 
institutions; distance from educational institution; school enrolment rate and 
literacy rate. 
iii)  Access to finance – availability of financial institutions, distance from 
financial institutions. 
iv) Access to communication and other basic amenities – electricity, post-office, 
distance from post office, distance from bus and railway services, average 
distance from the nearest town, access to paved road and mud road.  
v) Nature of work participation – marginal workers, main workers and 
agricultural workers (all as a percentage of total workers), workforce 
participation rate. 
vi) Living standard: Proportion of household living in pucca houses 
                                                                                                                                                 
31
 We limit our analysis to five states for convenience. 
32
 For Gujarat due to non-availability of data on PCI in1999 we use Gross District Domestic Product per 
capita in 2001 available from Indicus Analytics’ dataset; for the same reason, for Rajasthan, PCI in 2001 
series is used for sorting districts.  
33
 For Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, one and two districts respectively were chosen from the middle of the 
distribution because these states have relatively less number of districts.  
34
 Selection of districts from the middle of the distribution might not change the average outcomes 
significantly. 
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vii) Poverty – Headcount Ratio (HCR) 
We test whether there is any statistically significant difference between the mean 
outcomes of the Red Corridor region and those of the ROI sample. We do the one-tailed 
t-test35 and report both estimated t-statistics and one-tailed p-values for all the indicators. 
One-tailed t-tests are done because for all the indicators under the alternative hypothesis 
we conjecture that the Red Corridor region is more deprived or backward compared to 
the ROI sample.  
 
Results 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Maoist movement got large-scale support from 
two groups of population, viz., the tribals and the dalits. Hence it is imperative to look 
into the demographic composition of the population of the Red Corridor region vis-à-vis 
our ROI sample. From Table 4 it is evident that Red Corridor region has a higher 
proportion (27.39 per cent) of tribal (ST) population compared to our ROI sample (11.37 
per cent). However, as Table 4 shows, the Red Corridor region has a relatively lesser 
proportion (15.74 per cent) of dalits (SC) population compared to our ROI sample (19.48 
per cent).36 Table 5 shows that this difference is statistically significant as well. Also, 
from Table 5 we can see that Red Corridor region has higher proportion of the average 
land covered by forest (120191 sq. km) as compared to the ROI sample (61300 sq km). 
Large forest lands are often used by the Maoists as hideouts to evade arrest and to 
organize armed struggles against the State. Table 4 also shows intra-group variation (SD) 
in the development outcomes for most of the indicators considered in this study. In terms 
of PCI in 1999, measured in logrithmic terms, the Red Corridor region is also worse off 
(9.27) in comparison to the ROI sample (9.88).  
 
Access to Health, Health Outcome and Awareness 
                                                 
35
 T-test as a parametric test is valid only when the underlying distributions of the variables follow normal 
distribution. The assumption of normality is a strong assumption. Hence we also tested the differences in 
development outcomes between the two groups of districts using non-parametric tests which gave 
qualitatively similar results.    
36
 The focus of this chapter is on deprivations of the two regions in terms of various indicators of 
development and hence we emphasize more on SC and ST populations because they are the most deprived 
groups in India. We do not explicitly mention the general category population here although they are the 
majority in terms of population share in both the sample groups. 
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During 2001, sample districts in the Red Corridor region had on an average five hospitals 
and dispensaries per one lakh population in comparison to 11 for the ROI sample (see 
Table 4). Table 6 shows that this unequal access is also statistically significant (t-statistic 
= 3.0). The Red Corridor region lacks access to health facilities not only in terms of 
hospitals and dispensaries but also in terms of the number of health centres and 
community health workers. All the t-statistics except for registered medical practitioners 
reported in Table 6 are statistically significant in terms of the level of significance at 5 
per cent. Apart from availability, distance from the health facilities also matters. If the 
health centre is far away then poor households have to incur higher cost even for minor 
health checkups, and that acts as a deterrent to accessing health services. Table 7 shows 
that approximately 38 per cent of the Red Corridor district’s population as compared to 
22 per cent of the population of our ROI sample districts had access to a primary health 
centre (PHC) which was at a distance of 10 km or more and this difference is statistically 
significant (t-statistic = -6.30). Average health outcomes of the districts in Red Corridor 
region are more appalling compared to the ROI sample. The average IMR of the Red 
Corridor region was 65.38 in 2001 and the same for the ROI sample was 53.65 (see Table 
8). Average LEB figures were 62 years and 65 years for the Red Corridor region and the 
ROI sample respectively. Differences in these health outcomes are statistically significant 
as well (t-statistics are -2.50 and 2.41 for IMR and LEB respectively). Using data from 
the DLHS survey we examine whether there was any sign of improvement in health 
accessibility at least at the village level in 2007-08. In Table 9, we report average 
accessibility figures at the village level. At the village level, disparity exists in terms of 
availability of doctor (t-statistic = 3.15). For other government-run health facilities we 
don’t find any statistically significant difference in the mean accessibility at the village 
level.           
 
Access to Education 
From Table 4 it is evident that the Red Corridor region had more number of primary 
schools (98) per one lakh population compared to the ROI (95.31) in 2001 but from Table 
10 we can see that this difference is not statistically significant (t-statistic = -0.26). 
However, when it comes to higher levels of school education (secondary and senior 
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secondary) the Red Corridor region has much lower access in comparison to the ROI. 
There were 8.78 secondary schools per one lakh population in the Red Corridor region as 
compared to 13.47 secondary schools per one lakh population of the ROI sample (see 
Table 10). The Red Corridor region had similar low accessibility to senior secondary 
schools as well. However, on the contrary, the Red Corridor region had a higher number 
of colleges (0.73) per one lakh population compared to the ROI sample (0.37) but this 
difference is not statistically significant (p-value is high).  Distances from educational 
institutions also determine accessibility and educational outcomes. If schools are far  then 
it takes more time for the kids to reach schools and often non-availability of paved roads 
poses a serious problem in reaching schools during the rainy season. This can adversely 
affect educational outcomes; e.g. school attendance. However, as Table 11 shows, there 
is no statistical difference at the 5 per cent level of significance between the Red Corridor 
region and the ROI, in terms of the proportion of population having access to the primary 
school within 5 km distance and above 10 km distance, though educational outcomes 
vary significantly (see Table 12). Average school enrolment rates were 41.80 per cent 
and 52.95 per cent for the Red Corridor region and ROI sample respectively in 2001, and 
this difference is highly statistically significant (p-value is too low). The other 
educational outcome, the literacy rate, was also lower for the Red Corridor region (55.29 
per cent) as compared to the ROI sample (68 per cent). If people are illiterate then they 
cannot effectively participate in the mainstream economy and hence their income earning 
potential remains low. They also tend to suffer from other impoverishments such as poor 
health, low productivity, etc. This is perhaps what has happened in case of the poor 
households of the Red Corridor region as well.      
 
Access to Finance 
Financial inclusion has become a buzzword in recent development policy pedagogy. 
Better access to finance reduces the poor households’ dependence on usurious 
moneylenders and helps them manage their money more efficiently. We consider 
proportion of households having a bank account a proxy for access to finance. Although 
this is a very narrow and imperfect measure, but going by this measure, we find that 
financial inclusion in the Red Corridor region has been sluggish as compared to the ROI 
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(see Table 13). In 2001, districts belonging to the Red Corridor region on an average had 
27 per cent households with a bank account while sample districts from the ROI had 
around 39 per cent households with bank accounts. The difference in mean test also quite 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis of equal means (p-value is very low). Penetration of 
the bank account also depends on availability of bank branches and distance from the 
branch. From Table 13, it is also evident that the Red Corridor region on an average had 
lower number of commercial banks, cooperative banks and agricultural credit societies 
per one lakh population in comparison to the ROI. This unequal availability of financial 
institutions is also found to be highly statistically significant for all types of financial 
institutions considered: commercial banks and cooperative banks, except for agricultural 
credit societies. The distance from the financial institution determines the opportunity 
cost of visiting the branch of the financial institution. Table 14 shows that nearly 48 per 
cent of the population in the Red Corridor districts had to travel more than 10 km to 
access a cooperative bank compared to only 26 per cent in the ROI in 2001. This 
difference in accessibility in terms of distance is highly significant at any conventional 
level of significance.     
 
Access to Communication and other Basic Amenities 
Access to certain basic amenities (e.g. electricity) and communication services or 
facilities enhances quality of life. S. R. Khandker et al. (S. R. Khandker et al. 2012) show 
that rural electrification positively affects rural poverty alleviation. In 2001, only 28 per 
cent of the households in the sample districts from the Red Corridor region were using 
electricity as a source of light. The comparable figure for the ROI was 77 per cent (see 
Table 15). The difference in mean test reveals that this difference is statistically 
significant (t-statistic = 12.68). Nowadays modern post offices serve not only as an 
access point for sending mails but also receive savings deposits, disburse remittances, etc. 
In 2001, the average number of post offices per one lakh population in the Red Corridor 
districts was 17 while that of the ROI sample was 27; the difference in mean test rejects 
the null of equal means (t-statistic = 2.81). Table 16 shows that in the Red Corridor 
region, approximately 13 per cent of the population had access to a post office within a 
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range of 5-10 km while about 5 per cent had access to a post office within the same 
distance range for the ROI sample.  
 
Better access to road connectivity has several positive effects (C.Bell and S. V. Dillen 
2012). Firstly, improved access to road connectivity helps in integrating remote rural 
economies with bigger markets and thus opens up opportunities for rural households to 
get better prices and hence higher incomes. Secondly, it favourably affects school 
attendance of both students and teachers especially during the rainy season. Thirdly, it 
can help patients access healthcare, get timely treatment, reducing the morbidity rate. In 
2001, only 45 per cent of the population in the Red Corridor districts on an average had 
access to a paved road while 62 per cent of the population in the ROI had access to the 
same facility (see Table 15). This inequality in access to a paved road also turns out to be 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 3.51). Proximity to towns also has several 
advantages: access to a bigger market, educational institutions and health facilities. The 
average distance of villages of the Red Corridor districts from the nearest town was 33 
km in comparison to the ROI figure of 19 km. This difference in distance is also 
statistically significant.  
 
Buses and railways are the two essential communication services. On an average, about 
15 per cent and 2 per cent of the population respectively in the Red Corridor districts and 
the ROI sample districts had access to bus services but at a distance exceeding 10 km (see 
Table 16). This difference in means is statistically significant (t-statistic = -6.74). 
Railway connectivity is even worse in the Red Corridor districts. More than 65 per cent 
of the population in the Red Corridor region had to travel more than 10 km to avail 
railway services but only around 50 per cent of the population in the ROI sample had to 
do so and this difference in accessing railway services is statistically significant at 5 per 
cent level of significance.          
 
Nature of Work Participation 
According to Census 2001 concepts and definitions, a worker is considered to be a main 
worker (marginal worker) if he/she has participated in any economically productive 
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activity for more than six months (less than six months) during  the reference period 
(usually one year). From Table 17 it is evident that in the Red Corridor region, on an 
average a higher proportion (32 per cent) of the workers were marginal workers as 
compared to the ROI sample (22 per cent), and the difference is statistically significant (t-
statistic = -4.53). The Red Corridor region also had a statistically significant higher 
proportion of workers (35 per cent) engaged in agricultural work as compared to the ROI 
sample (18 per cent). Finally, the average work force participation rate – measured by the 
proportion of population which  (marginal plus main workers) participates in any 
economically productive activity during the reference period – was lower (42 per cent) 
for the Red Corridor districts as compared to the ROI sample districts (44 per cent). This 
difference in work force participation rate is also found to be statistically significant at 10 
per cent level of significance. 
 
Living Standard 
We consider the type of housing viz. pucca house as a proxy for standard of living. Table 
18 shows that only 16 per cent of the population in the Red Corridor districts on an 
average resided in pucca houses which is less than half of the proportion of population 
(42 per cent) that resided in pucca houses in the ROI in 2001. This difference in the 
proportion of people staying in pucca houses between the Red Corridor region and the 
ROI is highly statistically significant. This implies that significant disparity exists in 
theaverage standard of living in the Red Corridor region vis-à-vis the ROI. 
 
Poverty 
From Table 19 it is evident that a large proportion (39 per cent) of the population in the 
Red Corridor districts lived below the poverty line (BPL) as compared to the proportion 
(16 per cent) of people in the ROI sample districts in 2004. The difference in the average 
poverty outcomes is also highly statistically significant (p-value is low).This high rate of 
poverty in the Red Corridor region is not surprising given the degree of deprivation of the 
region in terms of other development indicators previously discussed. 
 
Is There Hope? 
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The Registrar-General of India, recently released house listing data from the Census 
2011. The data is available at the district level for the Indian states. Hence, we also 
analysed the data for some of the development indicators for our sample districts to 
examine whether the development gaps between the Red Corridor region and the ROI are 
persisting or narrowing down over the decade, 2001-2011. In other words, our objective 
was to examine whether there was any sign of improvement in the development scenario 
in the Red Corridor region vis-à-vis the ROI sample districts. We specifically examined 
access to banking (percentage of households having bank accounts) and the following 
indicators of living standard: percentage of households with electricity connection, 
percentage of households residing in houses with cemented floors, percentage of 
households residing in houses with concrete roofs, and percentage of households living in 
houses with walls made of grass/thatch/bamboo/plastic or polythene. From Table 20, it is 
evident that access to banking services shows a marked improvement in the Red Corridor 
region. The percentage of households with bank accounts increased from 26 per cent to 
49 per cent between 2001 and 2011 in the Red Corridor region. However, the gap in 
access to banking between Red Corridor region and the ROI sample over the decade 
2001-2011 has increased significantly from 11 to 16 percentage points. Coming to 
indicators of living standard, our results show that  the percentage of households with 
electricity connection, percentage of households residing in houses with cemented floors, 
and percentage of households residing in houses with concrete roofs in the Red Corridor 
region increased between 2001 and 2011 but the gaps between the Red Corridor region 
and the ROI sample districts persisted. Houses with walls made of 
grass/thatch/bamboo/plastic or polythene signify poor living standard and the proportion 
of households residing in such houses in the Red Corridor region dwindled marginally 
between 2001 and 2011 from 4.61 per cent to 4.44 per cent. However, in the ROI sample 
districts the same figure fell to 2.7 per cent in 2011 from 3.12 per cent in 2001.  
 
Red Corridor Region and the Government 
The government resorted to “local resistance”, popularly known as “Salwa Judum” to 
combat the Maoist movement in certain states, for example, Chhattisgarh (G.Navlakha 
2006; H. Kumar 2009). According to K. S.Subramanian (K. S. Subramanian 2005: p. 
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729), “[t]he socio-economic factors behind [Maoist movement] must be analysed with 
detailed investigation of the patterns of administrative interaction with the rural power 
structure.” On the other hand, police atrocities and harassment of the tribals and dalits are 
also cited as reasons for their resentment against the government (K. S. Subramanian 
2010).  
 
To combat Maoism in India, the government has adopted a mix of carrot and stick 
policies. On the one hand, it increased administrative  and security measures in the 
region. Security-related expenditure scheme (SRE) for modernization of the police force 
for fighting the Maoists, formation of task forces and a centralized coordination centre 
headed by the Union Home Secretary with its state counterparts and Director-General of 
Police (DGP) of Naxalite-affected states are some of the steps towards organized 
retaliation against the Maoists. The government has tried to initiate peace talks with the 
Maoists with the help of mediators but most peace talk initiatives have been futile so far37 
(G. Navalakha 2006; P. Singh 2006). On the other hand, recognizing the development 
gaps in the Red Corridor region, the government adopted a number of programmes to 
improve the socio-economic situation. In Box 2 we discuss very briefly the main 
programmes,38 and policies initiated by the government to accelerate holistic 
development of the region. 
 
Box 2: Development Programmes Initiated by the Government 
i) Forest Rights Act, 2006 – This Act was enacted primarily to safeguard the rights 
of the tribals who have been living in forests for generations and to mitigate the 
injustice by earlier forest Acts (e.g. Indian Forest Act, 1927, Wild Life Protection 
Act, 1972, Forest Conservation Act, 1980). The Act recognizes three rights: land 
rights, use rights over minor forest products (e.g. tendu leaves, herbs etc.) and grazing 
grounds and right to protect and conserve the forests. 
                                                 
37
 One main pre-condition for peace talk was that the Maoists would have to give up arms before the 
dialogue began. Also see P Singh, “Naxal Threat and State Response” 
Source:http://hrm.iimb.ernet.in/cpp/pdf (accessed on Mar 3, 2012). 
38
 Here we discuss only those government schemes which were implemented with special emphasis on Red 
Corridor region. Other schemes which are implemented at a pan-India level across the length and breadth 
of the country are not mentioned here. 
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ii)   The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (NRRP) – This policy 
was introduced in 2007 to give adequate compensation to poor tribals who had been 
displaced from their own lands due to industrial expansion. Land in return for land, 
employment opportunity for one of the members of the displaced household, 
scholarships for the wards and housing benefits are some of the key compensatory 
features of the policy. 
iii) Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) – The BDI scheme was launched as one of 
the components of Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) which was run by the 
Planning Commission since 2004. The two schemes together cover nearly the entire 
Red Corridor region. A total of hundred backward districts of which thirty- two were 
affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) were covered under the BDI. The number 
of districts per state was decided on the basis of incidence of poverty. Selection of 
backward districts in each state was done on the basis of a composite index39 which 
comprised the  value of output per agricultural worker, agricultural wage rate, and 
proportion of Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) in the district 
population. Effective coordination between the Centre and the state governments is 
crucial for the success of this type of schemes. 
iv) Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF)40 – This programme was launched by the 
Ministry of Panchayati Raj in 2006-07 to “redress regional imbalances in 
development.” The main objective of the programme was to provide supplementary 
financial assistance to the states to meet “critical gaps” in local infrastructure and 
other development needs of some pre-identified backward districts of the respective 
states. The salient features of the scheme were “participatory planning, decision-
making, implementation and monitoring, [which] reflect [locally] felt needs.”  
v) Integrated Action Plan (IAP)41 – This scheme was launched under the BRGF 
programme for 82 selected tribal and backward districts of India. The implementation 
period of the scheme was 2010-11 and 2011-12 and a sum of Rs 25 crores and Rs 30 
crores respectively were sanctioned for each year for each district. The objective of 
                                                 
39
 Each of the parameters was given equal weights in the computation of the index. 
40
 For more details about the scheme visit: http://www.nird.org.in/brgf/index.html 
 
41
 For more details about the scheme visit: http://pcserver.nic.in/iapmis/login.aspx 
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the scheme was to build public infrastructure and provision some basic services like 
school, anganwadi centres, primary health centres, drinking water supply, roads, etc.   
vi) Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) – This Act came into 
effect in 1996 when the Indian Parliament passed a special legislation as an annexure 
to the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution. The new Act entrusted special powers to 
the Gram Sabha in the scheduled areas. The key objective of the Act was to empower 
the local Gram Sabha for efficient management of natural and community resources; 
conservation and protection of traditional customs and rituals; and management of 
non-timber forest products.   
 
Some of the above-mentioned schemes could not yield the desired results due to 
improper implementation, low level of community involvement, under or mis-utilization 
of funds. For instance, according to the RSVY evaluation study report (2008) 
commissioned by the Planning Commission, 37 per cent of the RSVY funds was 
originally proposed for agricultural improvement in Bastar district in Chhattisgarh but 
only 24 per cent was actually spent for such a purpose. The figures for addressing 
unemployment of the same district were even more dismal (37 per cent proposed and 13 
per cent were actually utilized). Even benefits of existing employment generation 
programmes like MGNREGA do not accrue in its entirety to the poor beneficiaries. A 
study conducted by K. Banerjee and P. Saha (2010) in the Red Corridor region to 
evaluate the impact of MGNREGA on poor households’ livelihoods found that de facto 
the average man-days of employment per household under the said programme was 
“much lower” than the de jure 100 days of employment under the programme. Also, 
wages received by the households were lower than the minimum wages stipulated under 
the task rate system42 at the district level. To circumvent this problem the government 
resorted to payments through bank accounts and post offices. But this could not reduce 
the misery of the poor workers. They either lost working days by frequently visiting the 
banks or post offices for payments or got paid less than what they were entitled to due to 
dishonesty on the part of bank officials or lack of information about the functioning of 
                                                 
42
 This happened partly due to the outdated District Schedule of Rates (DSOR) and partly due to rampant 
corruption.  
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the bank accounts.43 On the positive side, the study found that wage income earned under 
MGNREGA was mostly spent to meet household’s food consumption expenditure and 
whatever remained after that was invested in agriculture. K. Banerjee and P. Saha (K. 
Banerjee and P. Saha 2010: p. 44) conclude that, such investment “has resulted in an 
increase in crop yield in the study regions…The increase in the crop yield has reduced 
the livelihood vulnerability of the small and marginal farmers.” Increase in employment 
opportunities in the study areas after the implementation of MGNREGA resulted in 
attenuation of the propensity for outmigration amongst the villagers.  
 
The question that arises at this juncture is: how did the Maoists react to MGNREGA? K. 
Banerjee and P. Saha (K. Banerjee and P. Saha 2010) found very little evidence of 
resistance from the Maoists in the implementation of the programme. However, they did 
oppose the construction of roads under MGNREGA because they believed that the sole 
purpose of road construction was to make access to the villages easier for the security 
forces. But the Maoists should also realize that improved roads enable poor villagers to 
access distant markets for better prices, access better healthcare facilities in nearest towns 
especially in case of a medical emergency, and improve children’s educational outcomes 
in terms of increased school attendance and lower teacher absenteeism during monsoon 
(C. Bell and S. V. Dillen 2012).  By opposing road construction, the Maoists are virtually 
depriving the poor tribals and dalits from all these benefits. They must therefore ask 
themselves: Can we deliver these benefits to the poor villagers?   
 
Conclusion  
Our results show that the Red Corridor region is impoverished and lags behind the ROI 
sample region in terms of most of the development indicators considered in this chapter. 
The poor households, mostly tribals and dalits44 dwelling in the Red Corridor region 
                                                 
43
 “In effect, the number of days wasted at the bank and post office to get their money is creating an adverse 
reaction amongst villagers who are expressing their unwillingness to receive their wages under this 
system.” (K. Banerjee and P. Saha, 2010, p 46) 
44
 We also recognize the fact that tribals and dalits are not homogeneous groups. But in the absence of any 
caste census or secondary data from other surveys specifically targeting these two groups, we could not do 
more detailed analysis for the two groups separately. This chapter looks at average outcomes across 
districts in the two regions and hence group-level analysis or intra-district analysis is beyond the purview of 
this study. 
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continue to languish when the plight of the rest of the Indians has been gradually 
improving.  The tribals and the dalits of the Red Corridor region failed to participate 
effectively in India’s growth process. Our results show that the Red Corridor region has a 
substantial tribal population. The State has to recognize that they need special attention 
and support. According to R. Guha (R. Guha 2007: p. 3311), “On the government side, 
this might take the shape of a sensitively conceived and sincerely implemented plan to 
make adivasis true partners in the development process.” A “security-centric” approach 
of deploying paramilitary forces in the Red Corridor region alone cannot yield the desired 
results. The State has to adopt an ‘ameliorative approach” to win the faith of the tribals 
and the dalits. Realizing this, the State implemented various schemes, programmes and 
enacted laws for holistic socio-economic development of the Red Corridor region which 
did not receive adequate attention of the development policy planners earlier. However, 
persistent confrontation between the State and the Maoists is thwarting the development 
process. “There is thus a double tragedy at work in tribal India. The first tragedy is that 
the State has treated its adivasi citizens with contempt and condescension. The second 
tragedy is that their presumed protectors, the Naxalites, offer no long-term solution 
either.”45 Both the central and the state governments have to work in tandem with each 
other for better social integration of the Red Corridor region with the ROI. 
 
One main limitation of our study is that it is cross-sectional and hence does not capture 
the dynamic patterns of growth and development in the Red Corridor region vis-à-vis the 
ROI. Simple mean tests did not allow us to control other potential factors having a 
bearing on average outcomes. Availability of a longitudinal dataset on development 
indicators at the district level would allow us to control other covariates when we 
compare a single development indicator between the two groups: the Red Corridor region 
versus the ROI. Again, due to non-availability of data on most of the development 
indicators and per capita income prior to 1999 at the district level we could not undertake 
a more rigorous and robust econometric analysis to examine the interplay between 
growth and development in the Red Corridor region. In future, when data from Census 
2011 becomes available, further research can be done to examine the dynamics of 
                                                 
45
 See R. Guha (2007, p 3311) 
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deprivation and impoverishment of the Red Corridor region. Such analysis can also bring 
out convergence or divergence of regional disparity over time.  
 
Based on our study findings, a brief discussion on the key aspects of a “multi-pronged 
approach”46 towards holistic development (e.g. launching of Integrated Action Plan) 
seems warranted at this point. Our results show that the region suffers from inadequate 
health infrastructure (e.g. hospitals and dispensaries, PHC, etc.). Hence, the government 
has to allocate sufficient funds for making health infrastructure available to them. Special 
provisions must be made under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 
implemented since 2005, for this region.  The State has to ensure that other components 
of the NRHM namely, providing safe drinking water, sanitation facility, etc. are 
implemented speedily in this region. If needed, the State should explore the possibility of 
making provisions under Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) model. For example, many 
corporates like Hindustan Unilever Limited, ITC Limited etc. have widespread 
distribution networks even in the remotest villages in India. These networks can be 
effectively used to create awareness about health and for providing certain essential 
services like safe drinking water, vaccination, health camps, etc. These strategies can go a 
long way in improving health outcomes of the region. We found evidence of the Red 
Corridor region lacking access to secondary and senior secondary schools and also 
lagging behind in terms of literacy and the school enrolment rate. Hence, the State has to 
improve availability of the education infrastructure by building more secondary and 
senior secondary schools. Also, building vocational schools and schools imparting other 
livelihood skills should be given more importance. To boost the literacy rate, beside the 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), the State has to launch special adult literacy programmes. 
In recent times, the government has emphasized financial inclusion. Our findings show 
that households residing in the Red Corridor region had low availability of all types of 
financial institutions considered: commercial banks, cooperative banks, agricultural credit 
societies. However, one of the main objectives of bank nationalization in 1960s was to 
expand the outreach of bank branches in backward areas. But our results on financial 
                                                 
46
 See “Widening Debate on the Naxalite Movement”, Economic and Political Weekly, 43 (19), 2008, pp 5-
6. 
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accessibility present a somewhat grim picture. Therefore, the government can promote 
micro-credit programmes and other self-help-group (SHG)-led financial inclusion drives 
in the Red Corridor region. The State has to give special attention to rural electrification 
and better road connectivity. Launching of schemes like the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) for augmenting power supply in rural areas and Pradhan 
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) for building all-weather roads are certainly  
laudable steps taken by the State in these directions. Effective implementation of these 
programmes will significantly improve living conditions and market access of backward 
regions like the Red Corridor region. We also found that a significant proportion of 
workers in the Red Corridor region were marginal workers. This is due to very limited 
employment and livelihood earning opportunities in the region. Hence, effective 
implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) can create employment opportunities for the poor tribals and dalits of the 
Red Corridor region especially during the lean season. Also, the State should provide 
meaningful alternative livelihood support to the tribals under the National Rural 
Livelihood Mission (NRLM) so that the tribal households’ dependence on forest 
resources is reduced. The State can also form a separate body similar to the National Skill 
Development Council (NSDC) dedicated solely to skill development of the tribal youth 
population under the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. The objective of the said body would be 
to identify livelihood skills suitable for imparting among tribal youth and to help them in 
getting employment and/or support financing for self-employment. Finally, to improve 
housing conditions, the State must ensure that the physical targets of the Indira Awaas 
Yojana (IAY) are met as far as possible in the Red Corridor region. Successful 
implementation of the above-mentioned schemes will certainly make a dent into poverty 
alleviation and will ameliorate the misery of the have-nots of the Red Corridor region.            
 
The success of a programme depends crucially on proper implementation and monitoring. 
Our earlier discussion on efficacy of government programmes shows that often the 
benefits of the programme do not accrue to the intended beneficiaries. The government 
has to ensure that the benefits of the development programmes reach the poor tribals and 
dalits who hitherto have remained deprived. Proper implementation can be ensured 
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through decentralized planning and by involving local people in decision- making. Social 
audit at regular intervals must be an integral part of the system of monitoring and 
programme evaluation. The recent announcement of Prime Minister’s Rural 
Development Fellows47 (PMRDF) initiative for the IAP districts by the Union Minister of 
Rural Development Mr. Jairam Ramesh is a welcome step to strengthen the service 
delivery to the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, in these backward areas the villagers’ 
awareness about government programmes and their basic rights is very low. K. Banerjee 
and P. Saha (2010) found that most villagers in their study areas did not know that 
MGNREGA is an Act and not a scheme. Therefore, on the one hand the State has to 
improve transparency in implementation through better governance and on the other it 
has to create better awareness among the tribal and dalit population about various 
schemes and Acts.  
 
Mao Tse Tung once said, “If we attend to these problems, solve them and satisfy the 
needs of the masses, we shall really become organizers of the well-being of the masses, 
and they will truly rally round us and give us their warm support… I earnestly suggest to 
this congress that we pay close attention to the well-being of the masses, from the 
problems of land and labour to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt. The women want 
to learn ploughing and harrowing. Whom can we get to teach them? The children want to 
go to school. Have we set up primary schools? The wooden bridge over there is too 
narrow and people may fall off. Should we not repair it? Many people suffer from boils 
and other ailments. What are we going to do about it? All such problems concerning the 
well-being of the masses should be placed on our agenda.”48 It is high time that the 
Maoist leaders should also ponder over these issues and evaluate their capabilities to 
deliver the same. Otherwise the poor tribals’ and dalits’ plight will never improve and 
they have to accept underdevelopment as a fait accompli. 
 
 
                                                 
47
 For more details see http://rural.nic.in/pmrdfs/ 
48
 As spoken while delivering the concluding speech at the Second National Congress of Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Representatives held in China in January 1934. (See 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_10.htm. 
Accessed on August 12, 2012) 
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Figure 1: Naxal Affected Districts in India 
 
 
 
Source: IDSA, at : http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_MeasurestodealwithNaxal.pdf 
accessed on Feb 23, 2012. 
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Table 1: Sectorial Growth Rates and Other Related Statistics 
 
1971-72 to 1980-81 1981-82 to 1990-91 2004-05 to 2009-10 
GDP    
Growth rate (mean) 3.16 5.64 8.3 
Coefficient of variation 
(CV) 
137.75 39.05 27.14 
Agriculture and Allied 
Service 
   
Growth rate (mean) 1.83 3.55 2.99 
Coefficient of variation 
(CV) 
475.21 150.74 162.74 
Industry    
Growth rate (mean) 4.05 7.11 8.67 
Coefficient of variation 
(CV) 
88.91 28.22 41.85 
Services    
Growth rate (mean) 4.42 6.72 10.05 
Coefficient of variation 
(CV) 
34.03 17.16 19.05 
Source: Central Statistical Organization and Author’s Own Calculation 
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Table 2: State-Wise Extent of Naxal Violence during 2007-2011 
 
Source : Ministry of Home Affairs 
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Table 3: Composition of Sample: Red Corridor Districts and Districts from Rest of India (ROI) 
A. Districts of red Corridor region (N = 60) 
State Districts 
Andhra Pradesh  Adilabad, East Godavari, Karimnagar, Khammam, Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, 
Vizianagaram, Warangal 
Bihar Arwal*, Aurangabad, Gaya, Jamui, Jehanabad, Kaimur, Munger, Nawada, 
Rohtas 
Chhattishgarh Bastar, Bijapur*, Dantewada, Jashpur, Kanker, Koriya, Narayanpur*, 
Rajnandgaon, Surguja 
Jharkhand Bokaro, Chatra, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Khunti*, Kodarma, 
Latehar*, Lohardaga, Pachim Singhbhum, Palamu, Purbi Singhbhum, Ramgarh*, 
Ranchi (Rural), Saraikela*, Simdega* 
Odisha Debagarh, Gajapati, Ganjam, Jajapur, Kandhamal, Kendujhar, Koraput, 
Malkangiri, Mayurbhanj, Nabarangapur, Nayagarh, Rayagada, Sambalpur, 
Sundargarh 
West Bengal Bankura, Medinipur (West), Puruliya 
B. Sample districts from the rest of India (ROI) (N = 55) 
State Districts 
Gujarat Banas Kantha (12), Bharuch (48), Bhavnagar (18), Dohad (7), Gandhinagar (36), 
Jamnagar (90), Junagadh(20), Mahesana(20), Panch Mahals (11), Rajkot(21), 
Sabar Kantha (13), Valsad (49)   
Himachal Pradesh Chamba (62.7), Kangra (19.7), Kinnaur (32), Kullu (21.3), Lahul and Spiti 
(62.7), Mandi (17.5), Shimla (25.8), Solan (46.4), Una(23.1) 
Punjab Fatehgarh Sahib (35.6), Gurdaspur (23.5), Hoshiarpur (24), Jalandhar (31.7), 
Mansa (25), Muktsar (24.6), Nawan Shehar (30.4), Patiala (30.2), 
Rupnagar(28.8), Sangrur(29.2),  
Rajasthan Banswara (9.6), Bharatpur (13.29), Bhilwara (18.7), Bikaner (18.1), Chittaurgarh 
(12.89), Churu (8.9), Dholpur (8.8), Dungarpur (10.3), Ganganagar (20.3), Kota 
(19), Pali (14.24), Rajsamand (13.85),   
Tamil Nadu Coimbatore (27.6), Krishnagiri* (15.7), Nagapattinam (18.9), Namakkal (28.1), 
Nilgiri (20), Perambalur (13.5), Thiruvarur (16.2), Thoothukodi (25.7), 
Tirunelveli (21.1), Villupuram (13.3), Virudhunagar (29.8), Vellore (20.9).  
Note: Per-capita income (PCI) of the districts from the rest of India in 1999 is indicated in parenthesis. 
Figures are in thousand rupees. *- districts created newly in 2001 or later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 SC Population (% of total population) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 2.96 90.5 15.74 13.4 52 
Rest of India sample 2.33 96.8 19.48 15.2 54 
 ST Population (% of total population) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 0.08 79.9 27.39 24.1 52 
Rest of India sample 0 83.8 11.37 22.4 54 
 Forest Land (in sq km) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 272 485928 120191 110803 52 
Rest of India sample 0 415451 61300 79330 53 
 
 No. of hospitals and dispensaries# 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 1.15 18.12 5 3.58 52 
Rest of India sample 0.82 90.29 11 14.47 54 
 No of health centres# (Health centre +PHC+ PH Sub centre) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 2.77 51.15 15.44 9.42 52 
Rest of India sample 4.01 138.4 21.7 20.3 54 
 Any govt. health facility (% of villages) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 11.9 100 44.13 25.69 55 
Rest of India sample 3.6 96.2 48.63 16.86 55 
 IMR 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 36 121 65.38 19.27 49 
Rest of India sample 21 144 53.65 25.09 44 
 No. of primary school# 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 32.68 229.86 98.94 44.33 52 
Rest of India sample 25.98 638 95.31 91.82 54 
 
     Continued 
      
 Literacy rate (%) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 30.5 77.2 55.29 10.78 51 
Rest of India sample 44.6 81.5 68.05 10.05 54 
 No. of cooperative banks# 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 0.09 7.22 1.33 1.42 52 
Rest of India sample 0.66 15.05 3.55 3.05 54 
 Household with electricity connection (%) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 4.6 85.5 28.68 20.69 51 
Rest of India sample 27.2 97.6 77.2 18.32 54 
 Proportion of population having access to paved road 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 12.44 72.24 45.56 28.58 52 
Rest of India sample 19.34 128.95 62.20 18.96 54 
 Mainworkers (% of total workers) 
 36
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 52.18 86.07 67.96 8.58 49 
Rest of India sample 51.24 92.46 78.19 10.47 54 
 Head Count Ratio (HCR) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 3.73 88.16 39.49 18.62 50 
Rest of India sample 0.85 53.62 16.68 13.13 52 
 Log (Per capita income-1999) 
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Red Corridor region 8.45 9.94 9.27 0.38 53 
Rest of India sample 8.60 11.07 9.88 0.50 55 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population  
Source: authors’ own calculation 
 
 
Table 5: Mean Test Results of SC and ST population and forest land (sq km) 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
SC Population (% of 
total population) 
15.74 19.49 t = 1.34a 
(0.90) 
106 
ST Population 
 (% of total population) 
27.39 11.37 t = -3.54a 
(0.000) 
106 
Forest Land (sq km) 120191 61300 t = -3.12a 
(0.001) 
105 
Notes: one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
 Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
 
 
Table 6: Mean Test Results of Access to Healthcare Facilities (2001) 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test 
Result 
N 
No. of hospitals and 
dispensaries# 
4.94 11.05 t = 3.00b 
(0.001) 
106 
No of health centres# 
(Health centre +PHC+ 
PH Sub centre) 
15.44 21.75 t = 2.06b 
(0.02) 
106 
No. of registered medical 
practioners# 
8.40 10.36 t = 0.74b 
(0.22) 
106 
No. of community health 
workers# (CHW) 
4.77 10.64 t = 3.01b 
(0.001) 
106 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population  
 
Table 7: Distance from Primary Health Centre (PHC) in 2001 
Proportion of population 
having access to PHC with  
Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
0< distance ≤5 km 16.48 21.39 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 23.77 22.28 
distance > 10 km* 37.18 22.47 
Notes: *t-test result for this category – t = -6.30 (one-tailed p-value = 0.000); d.f = 104 
# - measured per one lakh population  
one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
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Table 8: Mean Test Results of Health Awareness and Health Outcomes 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
HH using safe drinking 
water (%) 
57.16 84.60 t = 8.31b 
(0.000) 
91 
HH with vaccination card 
(%) (2007-08) 
48.88 40.51 t = -2.68b 
(0.99) 
109 
IMR 65.38 53.65 t =-2.50a 
(0.007) 
93 
LEB 62.93 65.20 t = 2.41b 
(0.009) 
90 
Notes: one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
 a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 9: Mean Test Results of Access to Healthcare Facilities (2007-08) 
  
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
Proportion of villages 
with a PHC 
16.77 11.46 t =-1.19 b 
(0.88) 
110 
Proportion of villages 
with any govt. health 
facility 
44.13 48.63 t =1.08 b 
(0.14) 
110 
Proportion of villages 
with a doctor 
10.75 16.87 t =3.15b 
(0.001) 
110 
Proportion of villages 
with ASHA 
57.86 38.36 t =-3.26 b 
(0.99) 
110 
Notes: one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
 a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 10: Mean Test Results of Access to Educational Institutions 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
No. of primary schools# 98.94 95.31 t = -0.26 b 
(0.60) 
106 
No. of middle schools# 22.21 26.24 t =0.93 b 
(0.17) 
106 
No. of secondary schools# 8.78 13.47 t = 2.18 b 
(0.02) 
106 
No. of senior secondary 
schools# 
1.55 4.54 t =3.68 b 
(0.000) 
106 
No. of colleges# 0.73 0.37 t = - 3.16 b 
(0.99) 
106 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population 
            one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
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Table 11: Mean Test Results of Distance from Primary School 
Proportion of population 
having access to primary 
school with 
Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
0< distance ≤5 km 7.26 3.72 t = -2.70 b 
(0.99) 
105 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 2.16 0.19 t = - 4.07 a 
(0.000) 
93 
distance > 10 km 2.26 0.04 t = -1.56 a 
(0.06) 
83 
Notes:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
 a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 12: Mean Test Results of Educational Outcomes 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
School enrolment (%) 41.80 52.95 t =6.57 b 
(0.000) 
 
105 
Literacy rate (%) 55.29 68.06 t =6.26 b 
(0.000) 
 
105 
Notes:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 13: Mean Test Results of Access to Finance 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
HH with bank account (%) 26.67 38.68 t = 4.89 b 
(0.000) 
105 
No of commercial banks# 3.93 5.02 t = 1.75 b 
(0.04) 
106 
No of cooperative banks# 1.33 3.54 t = 4.82 b 
(0.000) 
106 
No of agricultural credit# 
societies 
7.35 15.31 t = 3.62 b 
(0.000) 
106 
No. of non-agricultural# credit 
societies 
5.51 3.38 t = -0.99 b 
(0.84) 
106 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population 
            one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39
Table 14: Mean Test Results of Distance from Cooperative Bank 
Proportion of population 
having access to cooperative 
bank with  
Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
0< distance ≤5 km 12.57 21.29 t = 3.97 b 
(0.000) 
106 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 22.25 19.38 t = -1.55 a 
(0.06) 
106 
distance > 10 km 47.56 26.21 t = -5.91 a 
(0.000) 
106 
Notes:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 15: Mean Test Results of Access to Communication and Other Amenities 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
HH with electricity connection 
(%) 
28.68 77.19 t = 12.68b 
(0.000) 
105 
No. of post offices# 17.03 27.36 t = 2.81 b 
(0.003) 
106 
Proportion of population having 
access to mud road 
62.00 44.17 t = -3.77a 
(0.000) 
104 
Proportion of population having 
access to paved road 
45.56 62.20 t = 3.51 b 
(0.000) 
106 
Avg. distance from nearest town 
(in km) 
33.15 19.42 t = -4.66a 
(0.000) 
106 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population 
            one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 16: Mean Test Results of Distance from Communication Services 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
Proportion of population having access to post office with 
0< distance ≤5 km 34.11 24.01 t = -3.38 b 
(0.99) 
106 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 13.04 5.35 t = -6.19 a 
(0.000) 
106 
Distance > 10 km 4.45 1.86 t = -4.04 a 
(0.000) 
102 
     
Proportion of population having access to bus services with 
0< distance ≤5 km 21.46 10.89 t = - 5.27 b 
(1) 
103 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 17.28 4.10 t = - 9.52 a 
(0.000) 
101 
Distance > 10 km 15.10 2.37 t = - 6.74 a 
(0.000) 
96 
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Proportion of population having access to railway services with 
0< distance ≤5 km 6.75 9.47 t = 2.42 b 
(0.009) 
99 
5 km <distance ≤ 10 km 11.53 14.04 t = 1.66 a 
(0.95) 
101 
distance > 10 km 67.81 50.98 t = - 3.83 a 
(0.000) 
105 
Notes:   one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 17: Mean Test Results of Nature of Workforce 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
Main workers (% of total  
workers) 
67.96 78.19 t = 5.44b 
(0.000) 
103 
Marginal workers (% of total  
workers) 
32.03 21.80 t = -4.53a 
(0.000) 
103 
Agricultural workers (% of total  
workers) 
35.92 18.01 t = -8.00a 
(0.000) 
103 
Workforce participation rate 42.58 44.56 t =1.47b 
(0.07) 
105 
Note:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.   
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
Table 18: Mean Test Results of Quality of Housing 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
Household staying in pucca 
houses (%) 
16.66 42 t = 7.63b 
(0.000) 
95 
Notes:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            b - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
 
Table 19: Mean Test Results of Poverty 
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test result N 
Head Count Ratio (HCR) 39.5 16.68 t = -7.12a 
(0.000) 
102 
Notes:  one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
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Table 20: Common Indicators of Living Standard between 2001 and 2011: A Comparison  
 Mean of 
Red Corridor 
Region 
Mean of 
ROI Sample 
Test Result N 
HH with electricity connection ( per cent) 
2001 26.31 76.89 t = 13.91b 
(0.000) 
110 
2011 44.09 87.07 t = 10.54b 
(0.000) 
111 
 
HH with bank account (per cent) 
2001 26.87 37.94 t = 4.58 b 
(0.000) 
110 
2011 49.50 66.02 t = 6.65 b 
(0.000) 
111 
 
    
HH floor made of cement (per cent) 
2001 19.81 34.77 t = 4.63 b 
(0.000) 
110 
2011 26.07 41.57 t = 4.41 b 
(0.000) 
111 
HH roof made of concrete (%) 
2001 15.74 22.85 t = 2.75 b 
(0.003) 
110 
2011 23.10 32.96 t = 2.75 b 
(0.003) 
111 
 
    
HH wall made of grass/thatch/bamboo/plastic/polythene etc. (per cent) 
2001 4.61 3.12 t = -1.50 a 
(0.06) 
110 
2011 4.44 2.70 t = -2.35 a 
(0.010) 
111 
Notes: # - measured per one lakh population 
            one-tailed p-values are in parenthesis.  
 H0: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) = 0 
            a - Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) < 0 
            b- Ha: mean (rest of India sample) − mean (red Corridor region) > 0 
 
 
